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Background: Blood collection following nonstandard operations largely increases the risks of infectious diseases
through cross-contamination. Commercial plasma donation and the resulting HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C epidemics in
central China in the 1990s killed more than one million people. Many blood banks have since moved to more
remote southwest provinces, which have become new suppliers of blood plasma.
Methods: Utilizing a primary longitudinal survey, this paper documents commercial plasma donation and estimates
its negative health impacts in impoverished rural China using individual fixed effect models. Both the linear
regression model and generalized linear models are utilized.
Results: Attracted by the financial compensation, a majority of plasma donors are poor, and bear grave
consequences of malnutrition and worse health status as a result of unhygienic and frequent donations. Donating
plasma is associated with a .83 standard deviation (SD) decline in self-rated health, a .54 SD lower self-rated health
relative to peers in their age group, a .74 SD higher chance of being infected with hepatitis, lacking of strength to
conduct farm work, and experiencing appetite loss, fatigue, nausea, and vomiting.
Discussion: Results indicate an urgent need of more comprehensive and effective interventions on hepatitis
screening, diagnosis, and treatment among plasma donors in less developed contexts to eliminate cross-infection
of infectious diseases and possible widespread epidemic in the future. Besides, we should encourage voluntary
plasma donation to gradually crowd out paid donation.
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Whether human bodies, including human blood, should
be excluded from trade, has been a fundamental ques-
tion under heated debate. Some argue that legalizing
commercial blood donations may crowd out voluntary
and selfless donors who signal pro-social characteristics,
and financially incentivized donors would be more likely
to transmit diseases than voluntary donors. Paid dona-
tions raise major concerns over quality risks (Titmuss,
1970; Zhao, 2007; WHO, 2014), partly due to asymmet-
ric information in that blood product buyers are not in a
position to know what they buy, whereas blood product
suppliers know what they sell (Arrow 1972).
There are two separate blood markets, one for whole
blood and the other for blood plasma. The former isCorrespondence: xi.chen@yale.edu
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in any medium, provided the original work is pmainly used for clinical blood transfusion, and the latter is
extracted by pharmaceutical companies to produce blood
products, such as intravenous immunoglobulin (IVIG), al-
bumin, and anti-inhibitor. Some countries allow no ex-
traction of blood plasma from whole blood. Many
countries stipulate that whole blood donation must be on
a voluntary basis with no financial compensation, while in
some countries tiny compensation or gift is offered to
cover transportation cost and nutrition subsidy. However,
large financial compensations are often provided to en-
courage blood plasma donation on a regular basis, espe-
cially in underdeveloped areas (Kanbur, 2004).
Paid plasma donors are often labeled poor and rely on
plasma donation as a source of income. Offering large fi-
nancial incentives would cause those in need of money to
take too many risks. First, frequent plasma donation with-
out adequate nutrients compensation may greatly endan-
ger health status. Second, the nonstandard operations ton Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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contexts, because they often ignore sterilization, lack ac-
curate virus detection methods, improperly share centri-
fuge machines or use non-disposable needles (Prati, 2006).
The high risk of infectious diseases through cross-
contamination on plasmapheresis, such as hepatitis C,
may lead to chronic liver disease, cirrhosis and even hepa-
tocellular carcinoma (Alter, 2007). In the long run, malnu-
trition and infectious diseases may accumulate devastating
impacts on the human capital of poor plasma donors and
undermine governmental poverty alleviation efforts.
Meanwhile, understanding blood contamination and the
epidemic of infectious diseases is important to the inter-
ests of various social entities. Besides donors trying to
minimize the risks against own health, patients who de-
mand blood products care about infectious diseases asso-
ciated with plasma transfusion. Even the general public
worry about epidemic of infectious diseases that may bear
grave consequences. For instance, the induced HIV/AIDS
crises in China’s Henan province in the 1990s caused
thousands of deaths and left children unattended. Some
living AIDS carriers have married, had children, or moved
to other parts of China amid the largest internal migration
process in human history. A rapidly growing epidemic of
hepatitis attacked Guizhou in early 2006 during which the
incidence, the number of deaths, and the fatality rate of
the population in Guizhou all increased strikingly (China
HIV/AIDS Information Network CHAIN 2006). Local
blood banks were shut down shortly afterwards.
Further, the rapid economic growth in China and some
other fast developing countries has been accompanied by
strong domestic demand for blood products. The integra-
tion into the world economy has brought in large external
demand for domestic blood products, which may exacer-
bate the concern for supply shortage and inferior blood
quality.
However, in large part due to the difficulty in collecting
individual level data on stigmatized paid plasma donation,
there have been few empirical studies in China on this
issue, especially after China’s major HIV/AIDS epidemic
in Henan province in the 1990s and a major hepatitis epi-
demic in Guizhou province in the 2000s. This paper at-
tempts to fill this gap. While the gradual implementation
and enforcement of the Blood Donation Law in China has
generally promoted screening and diagnosis of potential
infectious diseases among plasma donors, the progress
has been uneven. This paper provides such evidence from
impoverished rural China, where most blood plasma
donors reside. Since the poor react more to the large fi-
nancial incentives for plasma donation and therefore are
more vulnerable to health risks associated with plasma do-
nation, we focus on evaluating their health impacts as a
result of frequent plasma donations with nonstandard op-
erations in unhygienic conditions.To investigate health impacts at the individual level, we
administered a multi-wave census-type survey to follow
the same individuals over seven years. Information on
self-reported health status, hepatitis infection, detailed
household and individual socioeconomic conditions as
well as community characteristics was collected from all
individuals in 26 villages in rural western China. The lon-
gitudinal feature of the dataset allows us to estimate an in-
dividual fixed effect model to remove potential time-
invariant confounded factors and draw more reliable con-
clusions on health impacts of frequent plasma donation in
unhygienic conditions.
The main findings in this paper include: 1) the payoff
from plasma donation, the pressure to get the son mar-
ried, and the family age structure all drive up commer-
cial plasma donation; 2) frequent plasma donation is
associated with significantly worse self-rated health out-
comes and a higher chance of being infected with hepa-
titis among the poor; 3) frequently donating plasma may
affect donors’ ability to engage in farm work via feeling
feeble, being easily infected with diseases, or experien-
cing physical discomfort in the busy season; 4) a major-
ity of migrants, whether they suffered from work
accidents or work-related disabilities, believe that plasma
donation is riskier than industrial injuries.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section
2, plasma donation in China is documented. Section 3 de-
scribes our multi-wave data collection process. Section 4
reports empirical results on the socioeconomic determi-
nants of commercial plasma donation and provides evi-
dence on its negative health impacts. Finally, section 5
concludes with a discussion about the policy and the limi-
tation of the study.
Methods
Study context
In China, the markets for whole blood and blood plasma
are separate: the former is mainly supplied by voluntary or
employer-organized donations in urban area, while the
latter prevails in rural areas and offers cash compensation
to blood plasma donors. The current regulation forbids
pharmaceutical companies extracting plasma from volun-
tarily donated whole blood. The greater commercial
demand for blood plasma makes it much more popular
than whole blood donations. Besides significant income in-
crease for plasma donors and booming profit for pharma-
ceutical companies, the plasma economy becomes a
lucrative source of income for middlemen.
The national regulation for plasma donation stipulates
that individuals are excluded from giving if they are older
than 50 or younger than 20, weigh less than 50 kgs for
males and 45kgs for females, or seriously disabled. In
addition, an interval of 15 days between donations is re-
quired for plasma, and 3 months for whole blood (Asia
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whole blood, the red blood cells are re-injected back into
the donor intravenously. To speed up the process, a donor
can be given blood from previous donors with the same
blood type and sent on his way while his blood is being
processed in a centrifuge machine.
Though tremendous efforts have been made, tragedies
of contamination among blood donors have left shadows
on the safety of the plasma derivative industry (Zhu,
2007). For example, in some cases even people tested
positive with hepatitis are allowed to give plasma; their
plasma is simply placed in a different pile. Contamination
of red blood cells during the process of obtaining plasma
was strongly suggested by the high prevalence of hepatitis
antibodies among repeat plasma donors. Compared to
whole blood donation, the rate of hepatitis infection for
plasma donation in China has been three times higher
(Gao et al., 2011).
Outbreaks of HIV infection among commercial plasma
donors from different areas occurred as early as 1994
(Wu et al., 2001). These have been attributable to the
unhygienic conditions under which plasma donation has
been carried out, with no proper sterilization procedure
implemented. Consequently, blood plasma donors, to-
gether with injecting drug users (IDUs), have accounted
for more than two thirds of China’s HIV infection, and
as many as 250,000 blood plasma donors became in-
fected by 2004 (Cohen, 2004). It is even estimated that
by 2003, over 1.2 million people had contracted AIDS in
Henan province alone, and blood transfusion in un-
hygienic blood banks is regarded as the root cause
(Tsang, 2003; Gao, 2005). During the same period, the
hemophilia patients infected by the use of contaminated
blood or plasma products represent another set of severe
social and medical problems.
There has also been a strong regional component to
both paid blood plasma donations and the resultant out-
break of diseases, which has spurred government efforts
to address this public health concern. For example, the
widespread HIV/AIDS epidemic in China’s Henan prov-
ince in the 1990s was attributed to unhygienic condi-
tions for paid plasma donation. China rapidly responded
to the epidemic by reducing the number of commercial
blood banks and tightening regulations. Many blood
banks in Henan province have since moved to more re-
mote southwest provinces such as Guizhou, which has
become a new supplier of blood plasma in China (Yin,
2006). Thus, the data for this study was collected mainly
in that area.
In 2004, there were 23 blood plasma stations in
Guizhou. By early 2006, they increased to 25 plasma
stations, which accounted for 40 percent of the total
blood plasma supply, rendering it the largest plasma
market in the country. However, despite the efforts of thegovernment to ensure greater attention to making blood
plasma donations safe, in early 2006, a rapidly growing
epidemic of infectious diseases hit Guizhou. As of January
2006, official data showed that the incidence, the number
of deaths and the fatality rate of category B infectious
disease increased by 21.36 percent, 65.38 percent and
36.28 percent on year-on-year basis respectively. By
March 2006, the three numbers further increased to
30.01 percent, 73.17 percent and 33.20 percent, respect-
ively (China HIV/AIDS Information Network CHAIN
2006). In the same year, all blood banks in Guizhou
were shut down due to Hepatitis contamination.
After steps were taken by the government to improve
the sanitary conditions of plasma donation in the region
the blood banks in Guizhou were commercialized and
re-opened in 2007. The regulation of the entire oper-
ation has been strengthened, through law and setting
standards and upholding to stricter licensing regulations
for plasma centers and fractionators. Public concerns
over blood safety are gradually being relieved, and confi-
dence is returning. However, this move switches blood
bank ownership to pharmaceutical companies that pro-
duce blood plasma products, which weakens regulation
under the Ministry of Health during possible public
health crises in the future.
Measures taken by commercialized blood banks to ag-
gressively increase plasma donations include almost
doubling the cash “nutrition” subsidy per donation and
awarding cash prizes to registered donors at the end of
each year. In addition, donors are required to donate
once every half month, with cash penalties assessed
when registered plasma donors delay their donation.
Due to the incentive scheme, there is almost no differ-
ence in donation frequency throughout each year:
donors usually donate plasma every half month. Mean-
while, once a family starts to donate plasma, it rarely
stops. One obvious reason is that plasma donation gen-
erates a great proportion of income that is non-
substitutable, while another important reason is that
regular donors often feel a lack of energy to do farm
work and have to rely on plasma donation eventually.
Survey design and data collection
The dataset for this study consists of a three-wave census-
type household survey in 26 randomly selected villages in
rural western China’s Guizhou province (Additional file 1:
Appendix Figure S1). Guizhou is one of the poorest prov-
inces in China, while per capita GDP and other main
socioeconomic indicators in our surveyed villages are
close to the median level in Guizhou (Additional file 1:
Appendix Table S1). More than 20 ethnic groups live
there, including Miao, Buyi, Gelao, and Yi that in total
comprise about 20 percent of the population, and the
major Han group accounts for the rest 80 percent of
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in 2007, and 872 households in 2010 were interviewed, re-
spectively. Due to the census feature of our survey, the
growing number of households surveyed over time re-
flects the natural increase of households in these 26 vil-
lages. All the participants in this study provided their
written informed consent to participate in this study. All
the data used in this study has been anonymized. The sur-
vey design, implementation, the result estimations of this
study, and potential ethics issues were approved by the
IRB for Human Participants in the Office of Research
Integrity and Assurance at Cornell University. The Proto-
col ID number is 0905000392, and the approved project is
entitled "Blood Donation, Status Seeking and Health
Outcomes".
At the beginning of 2005, the first-wave census survey
of all 802 households collected detailed community
characteristics and individual socioeconomic informa-
tion. Plasma donations were collected on each family
member, including those who were working outside the
county at the time of survey. Given the sensitivity of col-
lecting data on blood plasma donation, we made great
efforts to ensure the accuracy of these data, including
training of local enumerators who were able to effect-
ively interact with the residents in our sample villages.
Moreover, the enumerators were trained to identify and
probe into major discrepancies between income andTable 1 Income, poverty, income inequality and plasma dona
Main sources of income (percent)
Farming
Livestock
Local non-farm and self-employment
Remittance from migrants outside the county
Disaster relief, anti-poverty programs, deforestation subsidies
Gift income
Plasma donation income
Average annual plasma donation compensation per capita (CNY)
Cash compensation (or nutrition subsidy) in CNY for plasma donation (per 58
# households without plasma donor
# households with one plasma donor
# households with two or more plasma donors
Per capita annual income (CNY)
Income inequality (Gini)
Income inequality excluding plasma donation (Gini)
Income below poverty line of 892 CNY (%)
Income below poverty line of US $1.25 per day using 2005 PPP (%)
Source: Author’s three wave Guizhou survey data.
Notes: 1 USD = 6.2 CNY, PPP purchasing power parity. The 2005 PPP exchange rate
index.jsp. The Poverty lines for 2004–2009 are adjusted according to the published
China’s National Bureau of Statistics. The poverty line of 892 CNY per year in termsexpenditures, a strong indication that respondents con-
cealed plasma donation as an income source. In 2004,
donors received a cash “nutrition” subsidy valued at 80
CNY for the plasma contained in 580 cc of blood. 31.2
percent households surveyed engaged in plasma dona-
tion, and the compensation accounted for 20.9 percent
of per capita income (Table 1).
A follow-up survey of the same households was ad-
ministered in early 2007 and all 833 households were
interviewed. All individual hepatitis infection, other
chronic disease statuses, and self-rated health status
were surveyed. Blood banks in Guizhou were shutdown
in 2006 due to hepatitis contamination in some
branches. A few local residents were still able to donate
through traveling to other counties nearby after the
shutdown of the local blood bank in 2006, as the timing
of shutting down differs. However, the overall plasma
donation intensity in 2006 was much lower.
In early 2010, the third wave follow-up survey was con-
ducted for all 872 households. Similar to the 2007 survey,
individual hepatitis infection and self-rated health status
were surveyed. Out of a range between 1 and 5 (the
healthiest status equals 1, the least healthy status equals 5),
the average self-evaluated health status equals 2.59,
and the average self-evaluated health status relative to
peers equals 2.78; both are better than the median level.



















is at the “China-rural” level. See http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/
annual inflation rate in various issues of China Statistic Year Book, published by
of PPP equals US $0.61 per day.
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2006 to 34.69 percent in 2009. The decreasing trend is
likely due to more effective control measures taken by
local blood banks in screening hepatitis infection. The re-
cent prevalence of hepatitis infection among plasma do-
nors is similar to the 33.95% (95% CI: 29.80% to 38.17%)
reported in a systematic review of 64 studies on hepa-
titis C infection among plasma donors in China (Gao
et al., 2011). However, 7.32 percent of residents in the 26
surveyed villages are hepatitis infected, a rate much higher
than the estimated 3.2 percent in the general population
of Chinaa.
Overall, the lack of reduction in hepatitis infection rate
in rural Guizhou may involve the following potential rea-
sons. One, those who are not infected may migrate more.
Two, the older cohort generally have a higher probability
of hepatitis infection than the younger cohort and are less
likely to migrate. Three, paid plasma donors are usually
driven by economic benefits, therefore poor economic
conditions may make cash compensation attractive. Four,
a high hepatitis infection rate in the community increases
the chances of exposure.
Compared to previous waves, nutrition subsidies have





Per capita income (log) −0.042*** (0.0
Cadre and party membership status (dummy) −0.05 (0.0
Household size 0.026** (0.0
Year of education 0.004 (0.0
Ethnicity status (dummy) −0.164*** (0.0
Share of elderly −0.062 (0.0
Share of unmarried son 0.180** (0.0
Ratio of farm wage to plasma compensation −0.183 (0.1
Exposure to big diseases (dummy) −0.051* (0.0
Exposure to livestock deaths (dummy) −0.033 (0.0
Exposure to family member deaths (dummy) −0.007 (0.0
Village characteristics
Mean per capita income (log) −0.044 (0.0
Mean year of education 0.008 (0.0
Mean ethnicity status −0.122 (0.1
Mean share of elderly 0.208 (0.4
Mean share of unmarried son −0.397 (0.2
Year and village fixed effects Yes
N 2507
Notes: Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. *Significant at 10%; **Significavolume of blood plasma. While by our third wave data
collection the proportion of donors recovered to 14.1
percent of households and 6.1 percent of income, it was
still much smaller than the 2004 year level (Table 1).
Throughout the three waves, women are more likely
to donate plasma. Villages with more local odd job op-
portunities have higher proportions of female donors.
These patterns may reflect intra-household labor divi-
sions to accommodate agricultural production or off-
farm work, as the opportunity cost for men to engage in
these activities are higher than for women.
Results
Socioeconomic determinants of paid plasma donation
Before reporting the results on the health impact of
plasma donation, we estimate the decision to donate
plasma on the potential covariates at the individual level,
the household level, and the village level. Table 2 pre-
sents the results.
While the plasma donation compensation is rather
trivial to the rich, the amount of cash is still a strong in-
centive for impoverished farmers. An intensive donor
can earn much higher compensation from plasma dona-
tion than from any other income generating activities.ercial plasma donation
R2 R3
Donate volume # household
(log) Members donate
14) −0.282*** (0.098) −0.072*** (0.021)
45) −0.429 (0.289) −0.111** (0.056)
11) 0.134* (0.076) 0.033** (0.015)
03) 0.026 (0.023) 0.005 (0.004)
61) −1.100*** (0.394) −0.299*** (0.075)
79) −0.525 (0.581) −0.139 (0.106)
77) 1.234** (0.517) 0.204** (0.098)
45) −1.279 (0.979) −0.277 (0.173)
30) −0.328 (0.205) −0.033 (0.043)
30) −0.21 (0.202) −0.026 (0.044)
51) −0.114 (0.341) −0.087 (0.061)
65) −0.266 (0.444) 0.042 (0.099)
34) 0.046 (0.220) −0.008 (0.042)
77) −1.189 (1.189) −0.125 (0.191)
52) 1.127 (3.176) 0.226 (0.566)
90) −2.814 (2.036) −0.471 (0.431)
Yes Yes
2507 2507
nt at 5%; ***Significant at 1%.
Table 3 Summary statistics on self-rated health status
and hepatitis infection
Mean SD
Non-donor in both 2006 and 2009
Change in absolute self-rating 0.144 1.070
Change in relative self-rating 0.274 1.099
Change in hepatitis infection rate 0 0
Non-donor in 2006 but donor in 2009
Change in absolute self-rating 1.575 0.929
Change in relative self-rating 1.154 0.689
Change in hepatitis infection rate 0.533 0.516
Donor in 2006 but non-donor in 2009
Change in absolute self-rating 0.200 0.837
Change in relative self-rating 0.182 0.603
Change in hepatitis infection rate 0.083 0.289
Donor in both 2006 and 2009
Change in absolute self-rating 1.688 0.830
Change in relative self-rating 1.607 1.005
Change in hepatitis infection rate 0.016 0.126
Notes: Both absolute self-rating and relative self-rating of health status range
from 1–5. 1 corresponds to the healthiest status, while 5 indicates the least
healthy status. Relative self-rating evaluates health status relative to peers of
similar age.
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doubles the amount of daily wage in the local labor mar-
ket. The increase in the relative price between daily
labor wage and per plasma giving seems to discourage
plasma donation. Poorer families are more likely to en-
gage in paid plasma donation, donate more volume, and
involve more family members in donation.
Plasma donation has been a major income source that
helps lift households out of poverty in the short term
(Additional file 1: Appendix Figure S2) and reduces in-
come inequality (Table 1). Additional file 1: Appendix
Figure S2 shows that a greater proportion of households
have income higher than the national poverty line when
income from plasma donation is included. Table 1 indi-
cates that income inequality, measured by Gini coeffi-
cient, reduces when income from plasma donation is
counted in.
The local sex ratio is highly skewed due to son preference
and intense male farm labor demand (Additional file 1:
Appendix Table S1). Many surplus men of marriage age
often trigger competitive tensions in the marriage market,
so parents with an unmarried son have to signal via build-
ing fancy houses for marriage (Wei et al., 2012), investing
in expensive durable goods, throwing a costly wedding re-
ception (Brown et al., 2011). They also have to work harder
and participate in riskier income generating activities (Wei
and Zhang, 2011). Consistent with these findings, one inter-
esting pattern reflecting an unbalanced marriage market
pressure is that families with an unmarried son are more
intensively engaged in paid plasma donation.
Moreover, village leaders and ethnic minorities are less
likely to donate plasma. The latter is due to an ethnic cul-
ture against giving blood. Besides, more senior members
in a family is associated with less plasma donation. Fam-
ilies with members exposed to major diseases are less
likely to engage in plasma donation. These findings sug-
gest that current blood quality regulations on donors’ age
eligibility and physical strength are somewhat effective.
Besides OLS regressions that assume the error term to be
normally distributed, we estimate Generalized Linear Model
(GLM) that allows more flexible error term distributions
and more generalizable specifications. In Additional file 1:
Appendix Table S2, GLM estimations on three main plasma
donation decisions, i.e., whether donate, donate volume and
number of household members donate, are presented. The
results are very similar to the main results presented in
Table 2.
Negative health effects of paid plasma donation
Widely documented as a root cause of blood contamin-
ation and the resulting high prevalence of Hepatitis and
HIV infection among commercial donors (Wu et al.,
2001; Cohen, 2004), blood banks in rural China has been
mixing blood from several donors in the same centrifugeto cut the excessive cost in obtaining plasma. As a result,
blood banks in the surveyed region were shut down due
to an epidemic of infectious diseases. In this section, we
attempt to establish a positive relationship between
blood plasma donation and the potential risk of disease
infection and other negative (and even deadly) health
impacts.
Though information on HIV infection is too sensitive to
collect, in the second and the third waves of survey self-
rated health and hepatitis infection were collected at the
individual level. Plasma donation in unhygienic conditions
may affect health status in different ways, including mak-
ing body weak and infectious diseases. Therefore, Table 3
and Table 4 test the two channels. Comparing donors with
non-donors in 2009 among those who did not donate
plasma in 2006, the formal group is of worse health status,
of worse health status relative to peers in their age group,
and experiences a more serious deterioration in health sta-
tus over time (Table 3).
In the statistical analysis, individual fixed effect models
are utilized to remove unobserved time-invariant factors
at the individual level that could confound the identifica-
tion of paid plasma donation on health status. With
two-period longitudinal data, the individual fixed effect
model is equivalent to a difference model that estimates
how changes in individual plasma donation decisions be-
tween 2006 and 2009 affect changes in individual health
and hepatitis status after controlling for changes in a
Table 4 Blood plasma donation, individual self-rated health status and hepatitis rate (individual fixed effect
estimations, 2006 and 2009)
R1 R2 R3
Change in absolute self-rating Change in relative self-rating Change in hepatitis rate
Changes in donation decisions 0.823*** 0.518** 0.192***
(0.258) (0.227) (0.021)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
N 2775 3098 3189
R2 within 0.079 0.109 0.085
Notes: Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. Both absolute self-rating and relative self-rating of health status
range from 1–5. 1 corresponds to the healthiest status, while 5 indicates the least healthy status. The set of control variables is the same as Table 2. The difference
in sample sizes between two regressions is due to missing values in self-rated health status. Fortunately, those with missing values in self-rated health status are
no different from other respondents with regard to the set of socioeconomic covariates.
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rated health status tease out systematic report errors
that may exist in self-evaluated outcomes.
Results show that plasma donation is associated with sig-
nificantly lower self-rated health status. Specifically, donat-
ing plasma in 2009 (but not 2006) is associated with a .83
standard deviation decline in self-rated health, a .54 stand-
ard deviation lower self-rated health relative to peers in
their age group, and a .74 standard deviation higher likeli-
hood of being infected with hepatitis (Table 4).
It is possible that frequently donating plasma to a certain
extent starts to affect health and increase the risk of hepatitis
infection. However, to our best knowledge, there is no such
objective threshold recommended by medical professionals.
As a remedy, we redefine plasma donation to be 1 if this
person donates above the median level among all plasma
donors and 0 if this person donates below the median level.
We re-estimate Table 4 using this higher threshold, the re-
sults demonstrate even stronger impact of plasma donation
decisions on self-rated health status. The impact on hepatitis
rate does not change much, suggesting that the impact on
hepatitis infection works mostly at the extensive margin. In
other words, the likelihood of hepatitis infection is associ-
ated more with whether to donate than with changes in do-
nation intensity. b These results are available upon request.
Meanwhile, blood plasma donation may have a
devastating impact on agricultural production. Besides
lacking of strength due to insufficient nutrients com-
pensation after frequent plasma donation, donors in-
fected with hepatitis may experience, among others,
appetite loss, fatigue, nausea, and vomiting. In the sec-
ond wave, information on physical strength and farming
was collected from 527 households before the local gov-
ernment intervened and stopped the collection of more
information on commercial plasma donation. Among
them, 75 households engaged in blood plasma donation.
64.0 percent of donors become weak in strength and are
easily infected with diseases. 67.6 percent of donors feel
feeble and experience physical discomfort in the busy
season.Information on risk awareness associated with plasma
donation was also collected from migrants and plasma do-
nors in the sample. Though migrants are vulnerable to
work-related accidents as they conduct highly intensive
work in manufacturing plants, 61.9 percent of them be-
lieve that plasma donation is riskier than industrial injury.
Even for migrants who experienced work accidents and
are disabled, 19 out of 32 still believe that plasma dona-
tion is riskier. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, only a lim-
ited number of plasma donors were asked whether they
had any health checks before donation, 6 out of 15 donors
answered no. As a result of nonstandard operations, such
as neglecting sterilization, lacking accurate detection
methods, improper use of non-disposable needles, or
sharing unhygienic centrifuge machines in collecting
plasma, cross infection can be very serious if any donor
carries an infectious virus.
Conclusions
This paper documents commercial plasma donation in
impoverished rural China. Though trivial to the rich, the fi-
nancial compensation offers a strong incentive to the poor.
We find that the payoff from plasma donation relative to
local wage job, the pressure to get the son married, and the
family age structure all affect the decision to donate plasma.
Meanwhile, frequent plasma donation is associated with a
worse self-rated health status, higher rates of hepatitis, and
a lack of strength to engage in farm work.
The results indicate an urgent need of more comprehen-
sive and effective interventions on hepatitis screening, diag-
nosis, and treatment among plasma donors in less
developed contexts, which are important to control the
transmission of infectious diseases and possible widespread
epidemic in the future. Specifically, the key to reduce the
negative health impact, especially the incidence of hepatitis
or HIV/AIDS infection among plasma donors, is to encour-
age truly voluntary plasma donation and gradually eliminate
paid plasma donation, separate high-risk from the low-risk
volunteers, and eliminate cross-infection completely when
collecting plasma. In addition, a hepatitis C virus RNA
Chen Health Economics Review 2014, 4:30 Page 8 of 8
http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/4/1/30screening strategy was planned to roll out in all Chinese
blood banks shortly after the third wave survey in 2010,
which, if strictly enforced, should contribute to the reduc-
tion of hepatitis C virus prevalence rate.Discussion
Some limitations remain to be addressed. First of all, all
health outcomes are self-reported, which may suffer from
measurement errors. For example, due to the stigma and
sensitivity associated with hepatitis infection, people in-
fected may be more motivated to underreport plasma do-
nation and therefore underestimate its impact on hepatitis
infection. Fortunately, people with bad self-rated health
may not be incentivized to underreport plasma donation.
Therefore, comparing results from health outcomes with
different degrees of measurement errors may mitigate this
concern. Second, since no blood sample collection was
allowed in our surveyed region, we do not have accurate
individual level information on blood types and hepatitis
types. Fortunately, most studies so far have found no sig-
nificant differences between blood types and the rate of
hepatitis infection (Gao et al., 2011). Meanwhile, though
we cannot distinguish different hepatitis types, according
to village clinics most of the reported hepatitis cases in
our sample is hepatitis C, which at the population level ac-
counts for more than 70 percent of all post-transfusion
hepatitis infection. Third, compared to population level
datasets, our survey is small in sample size, preventing us
from investigating less frequently seen blood-borne dis-
eases. Lastly, while individual fixed effect models are esti-
mated and time-invariant confounding factors are
removed, potential time-variant confounded factors may
still exist.Endnotes
aThe national infection rate and the infection rate in
Guizhou may not be totally comparable as the national
rate only includes hepatitis C infection, while the Guizhou
survey did not separate hepatitis C infection from other
types of hepatitis infection.
bMeanwhile, it is unlikely that there exists a universal
threshold for all individual plasma donors over which
donation is considered excessive. Rather, the threshold
may vary by individual preference or health endowment.
For example, a healthy donor may have a higher thresh-
old than an ill donor. Our individual fixed effect estima-
tion strategy using the longitudinal data attempts to
remove individual level time-invariant preference and
health endowment that may affect the decision to donate
and the health impact. In other words, we estimate the
impact of donation on health status given individual
preference, endowment, etc.Additional file
Additional file 1: Appendix Figure S1. Location of the surveyed
region. Figure S2. Distribution of Per Capita Income (2004). Table S1.
Summary Statistics (2009). Table S2. Socioeconomic Determinants of
Engagement in Commercial Plasma Donation (Results using Generalized
Linear Models).
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